The relentless media criticism of the MOD for providing our troops with inadequate equipment has intensified. The Observer of 27 February gives a page to "The Ministry of Disasters - 'Smart' buying has delivered delays, guns that jam and ships that can't sail". The Today programme seems to relish highlighting a new problem every week. Every report recycles the previous catalogue of apparent incompetence. NAO reports are grist to the mill; disaffected comments from troops in the field or pilots on web discussion groups are quoted as accepted facts. The latest scandal is the need for all of the army's SA-80 rifles to be returned for modifications to prevent jamming in extreme weather conditions. This follows the revelation that the Tornados, which had been upgraded to GR4 standard, were now unable to drop precision bombs; that the army radios were so old that the few that worked could be intercepted by the Serbs in Kosovo; and that the Royal Navy was cutting ship speeds to save fuel. The Observer adds the scrapped defence intelligence computer system, and delays in the Merlin helicopter, the Eurofighter and the Nimrod upgrade programmes. Surprisingly, they did not include fast jet pilot shortages, medical services collapse and the continuing overstretch in the army.
Is this some new malaise in Defence? Are the criticisms valid? If so, who is to blame? And how can MOD do better? As one government White Paper looking at defence procurement said: "We must use every means at our disposal to help ensure that we get both our operational concepts and our weapon systems right first time". The Defence Secretary advocating this version of smart procurement was John Nott in 1981 in a White Paper which regretted deep cuts in ammunition, fuel, spares and activity. The paper also celebrated the excellent progress towards a modern airborne early warning capability through Nimrod AEW. In the end, Nimrod AEW would be cancelled after spending around £1 bn because it could not be made to work. Nor did the Falklands commitment rate more than a passing mention, despite the fact that it would be the over-riding operational problem within the year.
There is a tendency for every new Defence Secretary to think that MOD can be made more efficient. There are great uncertainties in planning and procuring military equipment: strategic context, technology risk, and domestic factors. The last decade has seen an extensive move to make defence run on more business-like lines, and the imminent move to resource accounting is a further step in this direction. While these moves have certainly highlighted some of the more bizarre inefficiencies of defence arrangements, there is little evidence to suggest that the MOD has solved the underlying problem. It may be that preparing for unknown and unquantifiable contingencies is bound to lead to some of the apparent blunders.
It is of course grossly unfair to blame the current MOD ministerial team for a failure in their much trumpeted Smart Procurement initiative. We shall discover in a decade or so whether they have instituted a system which performs a little better. The SA-80 rifle was procured 20 years ago in the light of the Falklands Conflict experience, and there has been plenty of time to give priority to rectifying deficiencies over the years since. The Tornado upgrade programme was designed to extend the total operational life of this aircraft to over 40 years. It was an expensive upgrade programme, but much cheaper than buying the next generation of combat aircraft. Inevitably with new data transfer systems all the systems have to be recleared for safe operation. Some will work first time, and receive their clearances. Others may prove technically challenging, or may take a long time to complete the evaluation and testing. It is quite normal to deliver aircraft to a squadron with only some of the operational clearances finished. Thus, we see the Tornado GR4 in flying service, but not yet cleared to carry and operate a Thermal Imaging Airborne Laser Designator (TIALD) pod.
What we may be seeing at the moment is perhaps a reflection of an overall feeling of concern within the Defence community. The intensity of operations and the willingness of the government to take on new commitments worries some. 10,000 troops were offered by Robin Cook last year as a standby force for the UN. Yet no new resources were given to the armed forces. The UK took the lead in Helsinki in December in developing proposals for the creation of a new EU deployable force of up to 15 brigades with air and sea support. Again there are no proposals for extra money. Within the MOD, there is an expectation that some financial relief may be coming shortly, if only to pay for the Strategic Defence Review. If the Treasury fails to deliver, watch for much more noise from the MOD critics, both insiders and commentators.