It turned out to be a very different celebration in Washington at the end of April than the one that had originally been planned to mark NATO's half century. For the past two years, staffs had been working to put together an agenda which would give a new sense of purpose to the Alliance for the future. The strategic concept, that had been agreed in 1991 after the end of the Cold War, was in dire need of a rewrite to reflect the new world order. The United States was keen to see NATO acting more pro-actively to bring peace and security beyond the immediate territories of the member nations. Some Europeans were less enthusiastic about a move away from the classic collective security rationale for NATO. The United States was also pushing hard for a more robust posture to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world. The birthday party would also in part be a celebration of the accession of the three new members (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). Some European nations had been pressing for announcements on a further tranche of new members, but there was little enthusiasm from the United States or the United Kingdom.
In the event, the Summit was totally dominated by the Alliance operations against Serbia. The launching of the air campaign had overtaken the development of a new strategic concept for NATO. Perhaps rather to the surprise a number of Alliance members, it had proved possible to get the governments of the 19 nations to agree to conduct a full scale air offensive against another European state, without a specific UN security council resolution authorising the use of military force. The Washington Summit of NATO heads of government met one month into the bombing campaign. In the first month of Operation Allied Force, events had changed NATO's original war aims. The acceleration of the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo had produced a refugee humanitarian crisis. The many tales of atrocities to the ethnic Albanians by Serb military and police forces had strengthened the political will within NATO. The failure of the bombing to bring Milosevic back to the negotiating table in first few days was causing both politicians and commentators to ask what happens if NATO has to secure Kosovo without an agreement from Serbia.
The question of the circumstances under which NATO ground forces would move into Kosovo has become a growing issue. In the first week of the air campaign, NATO's leaders were strong in their statements that ground forces would only be used after an agreement had been made with all parties including the Serbian government. Commentators (including the writer) criticised this policy on two grounds. First, all military campaigns should be planned with appropriate provision for the worst case. The air campaign might work on its own, but no one could be sure until it was tried. Since it would take two or three months to assemble an appropriate ground force in the region, the prudent military planner would want to start building up such a force from the start of the bombing. Secondly, it was clear from experience in Bosnia and during the Kosovo negotiations, that the risk of loss of territory was the strongest lever available to change behaviour in the Serbian leadership. Thus it weakened the West's negotiating position if the taking of Kosovo territory by force was discounted from the start. It has been interesting to watch how the political language has changed as the potential need for ground forces has dawned on NATO's political leadership. By week three, George Robertson, the Defence Secretary, was talking about the need for a permissive environment before NATO ground forces were put in to Kosovo. In the run up to the NATO summit, the British Government was explaining that ground forces would go in only when the Serbian forces were sufficiently degraded. Tony Blair arrived early for the Washington Summit, and used the opportunity to make it clear that he was prepared to go all the way in this operation, and was looking for the rest of NATO to follow. Unfortunately, the leaders at the Summit did little to advance this option, and since then we have, if anything, seen a cooling in the talk of a ground option.
So what ultimately was achieved at the Washington Summit? Aside from the very important discussions about the next steps in Kosovo operation, the NATO leaders agreed on a number of strategic priorities for the long term future of the Alliance. Most of these were lost to the wider public in the noise of reporting about Operation Allied Force. The official summit communique was summed up as: "NATO says it will expand its numbers and its functions".
It announced that the 19 member countries had:
These seven elements are all important for the future of NATO.
The Strategic Concept is an 18 page document, which recognises the changes in the strategic environment since the 1991 concept was produced. The main elements are:
Looking to further enlargement, the assistance received from the "front-line states" for the Kosovo crisis was rewarded by singling out Macedonia and Albania for special thanks, while also congratulating Romania, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria and Slovakia for progress made since the Madrid summit. As the communique says: "No European democratic country whose admission would fulfil the objectives of the Treaty will be excluded from consideration." There is little doubt that there will be some debts to be repaid in terms of accelerated admission to NATO after Kosovo.
On the arms control front, the communique said that: " Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance's security objectives." However for those that were perhaps looking for an withdrawal of US nuclear forces from Europe, the Strategic Concept makes it clear that there will be a continuing need.
"To protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance will maintain for the foreseeable future an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces based in Europe and kept up to date where necessary, although at a minimum sufficient level. Taking into account the diversity of risks with which the Alliance could be faced, it must maintain the forces necessary to ensure credible deterrence and to provide a wide range of conventional response options. But he Alliance's conventional forces alone cannot ensure credible deterrence. Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace."
In looking at the required characteristics for nuclear forces, the Concept emphasises the need for "widespread participation by European Allies involved in collective defence planning in nuclear roles, in peacetime basing on their territory and in command, control and consultation arrangements. Nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provide an essential political and military link between the European and the North American members of the Alliance." The concept also argues for a continuing need for sub-strategic nuclear forces based in Europe. These will be provided by dual capable aircraft and a small number of UK Trident warheads. Nevertheless, pressure for a re-examination of what nuclear forces are really necessary now led to a potentially important new initiative. "In the light of overall strategic developments and the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, the Alliance will consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and disarmament. The Council in Permanent Session will propose a process to Ministers in December for considering such options." Insiders have suggested that this may lead to some radical reductions.
The summit had a very different tone from the celebration that had been planned. The staff work to produce all these new initiatives has been difficult over the past months. However the focus of NATO on the current challenges of Kosovo in some ways eased the passage of all these new undertakings. The leaders were clear that the new Concept was being forged in the Balkans even as they were issuing the communique on 24 April. If NATO is able to resolve Kosovo satisfactorily over the coming months, the new Concept is likely to be a good building block for the future. If NATO were to fail, the promises of the Washington Summit would be consigned to history, and the future of the Alliance itself would be in question.