Life Begins at 50 - A New Start for NATO?

It turned out to be a very different celebration in Washington at the end of April than the one that had originally been planned to mark NATO's half century. For the past two years, staffs had been working to put together an agenda which would give a new sense of purpose to the Alliance for the future. The strategic concept that had been agreed in 1991 after the end of the Cold War was in dire need of a rewrite to reflect the new world order. The United States was keen to see NATO acting more pro-actively to bring peace and security beyond the immediate territories of the member nations. Some Europeans were less enthusiastic about a move away from the classic collective security rationale for NATO. The United States was also pushing hard for a more robust posture to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world. The birthday party would also in part be a celebration of the accession of the three new members (Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic). Some European nations had been pressing for announcements on a further tranche of new members, but there was little enthusiasm from the United States or the United Kingdom.

In the event, the Summit was totally dominated by the Alliance operations against Serbia. The launching of the air campaign had overtaken the development of a new strategic concept for NATO. Perhaps rather to the surprise a number of Alliance members, it had proved possible to get the governments of the 19 nations to agree to conduct a full scale air offensive against another European state, without a specific UN security council resolution authorising the use of military force. The Washington Summit of NATO heads of government met one month into the bombing campaign. In the first month of Operation Allied Force, events had changed NATO's original war aims. The acceleration of the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo had produced a refugee humanitarian crisis. The many tales of atrocities to the ethnic Albanians by Serb military and police forces had strengthened the political will within NATO. The failure of the bombing to bring Milosevic back to the negotiating table in first few days was causing both politicians and commentators to ask what happens if NATO has to secure Kosovo without an agreement from Serbia.

The question of the circumstances under which NATO ground forces would move into Kosovo has become a growing issue. In the first week of the air campaign, NATO's leaders were strong in their statements that ground forces would only be used after an agreement had been made with all parties including the Serbian government. Commentators (including the writer) criticised this policy on two grounds. First, all military campaigns should be planned with appropriate provision for the worst case. The air campaign might work on its own, but no one could be sure until it was tried. Since it would take two or three months to assemble an appropriate ground force in the region, the prudent military planner would want to start building up such a force from the start of the bombing. Secondly, it was clear from experience in Bosnia and during the Kosovo negotiations, that the risk of loss of territory was the strongest lever available to change behaviour in the Serbian leadership. Thus it weakened the West's negotiating position if the taking of Kosovo territory by force was discounted from the start. It has been interesting to watch how the political language has changed as the potential need for ground forces has dawned on NATO's political leadership. By week three, George Robertson was talking about the need for a permissive environment before NATO ground forces were put in to Kosovo. In the run up to the NATO summit, the British Government was explaining that ground forces would go in only when the Serbian forces were sufficiently degraded. Tony Blair arrived early for the Washington Summit, and used the opportunity to make it clear that he was prepared to go all the way in this operation, and was looking for the rest of NATO to follow.

So what ultimately was achieved at the Washington Summit? Aside from the very important tactical decisions about the next steps in Kosovo operation, the NATO leaders agreed on a number of strategic priorities for the long term future of the Alliance. Most of these were lost to the wider public in the noise of reporting about Operation Allied Force. The official summit communique was summed up as: "NATO says it will expand its numbers and its functions". It announced that the 19 member countries had:

• - approved an updated Strategic Concept;

• - reaffirmed our commitment to the enlargement process of the Alliance and approved a Membership Action Plan for countries wishing to join;

• - completed the work on key elements of the Berlin Decisions on building the European Security and Defence Identity within the Alliance and decided to further enhance its effectiveness;

• - launched the Defence Capabilities Initiative;

• - intensified relations with Partners through an enhanced and more operational Partnership for Peace and strengthened consultations and co-operation within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;

• - enhanced the Mediterranean Dialogue; and

• - decided to increase Alliance efforts against weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

These seven elements are all important for the future of NATO.

• The Strategic Concept is an 18 page document, which recognises the changes in the strategic environment since the 1991 concept was produced. The main elements are:
• -- Collective Defence: The Strategic Concept underscores the enduring core mission of NATO as the collective defence of its members under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
• -- Military Capabilities: The Concept reaffirms Allies' determination to strengthen Alliance defence capabilities by ensuring forces that are more mobile, sustainable, survivable and able to engage effectively on the full spectrum of NATO missions.
• -- New Missions: The Concept calls for improvements in NATO's capability to undertake new missions to respond to a broad spectrum of possible threats to Alliance common interests, including: regional conflicts, such as in Kosovo and Bosnia; the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; and transnational threats like terrorism.
• -- New Members: The Concept underscores NATO's continued openness to new members and Allies' commitment to enlargement as part of a broader effort to enhance peace and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic community.
• -- Strengthened Partnerships: The Concept reinforces Alliance efforts to build wide-ranging partnerships with the aim of increasing transparency and mutual confidence in security matters and enhancing the capacity of allies and partners to act together.
• -- European Capabilities: The Concept highlights development of a European Security and Defense Identity within NATO as an essential element of NATO's ongoing adaptation, enabling European allies to makea more effective contribution to Euro-Atlantic security.

The summit had a very different tone from the celebration that had be planned. The staff work to produce all these new initiatives has been difficult over the past months. However the focus of NATO on the current challenges of Kosovo in some ways eased the passage of all these new undertakings. All the leaders were clear that the new Concept was being forged in the Balkans even as they were issuing the communique on 24 April. If NATO is able to resolve Kosovo satisfactorily over the coming months, the new Concept is likely to be a good building block for the future. If NATO were to fail, the promises of the Washington Summit would be consigned to history, and the future of the Alliance itself would be in question.

Tim Garden

27 April 1999